Informal insurance and its complementarity with development by Weynants, Stéphanie & CSAE Conference 2007 Economic Development in Africa
Informal insurance and its
complementarity with development
Stéphanie Weynants
Preliminary version
Abstract
In this paper, we build a theoretical model where rural communities, in the absence
of insurance markets, provide insurance and investment in local public good. Taking
the agentsheterogeneous willingness to contribute into account, we solve the implied
conict of interest in a way coherent with social choice theory and we study the trade-
o¤ between informal insurance and development in two comparative statics exercises.
Better returns to investment or higher levels of future income do not necessarily trigger
higher contributions to the public good. Better outside options are equally detrimental
to informal insurance and to contributions to the project.
Keywords : informal insurance, public good, median voter.
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I. Introduction
In rural areas of developing countries, failing capital markets and the lack of State
intervention leave a leading role to local communities in the provision of credit, insurance
and public goods through voluntary mechanisms. In such environments, people tend to form
social groups - often called kin systems - in order to ll these gaps. Wolf (1955) denes a
kin system as "a system of shared rights and obligations encompassing a large number of
near and distant relatives." This institution may be viewed as "a social contract of mutual
assistance among members ... providing critical community goods and insurance services in
the absence of market or public provision of such goods and services." (Ho¤ K. & Sen A.,
2005).
Multifonctionality - credit, insurance, public good provision,... - is a major trait of kin
systems. Most of them have been studied in the literature. For instance, the occurence of
insurance mechanisms in local communities has been vastly discussed. In a seminal paper,
Coate & Ravallion (1993) characterize the best informal insurance arrangement that can
be sustained as a noncooperative equilibrium. The role of ex post participation constraints
is crucial and allows them to show that when the latter are not binding, the community
perfectly equalizes - ex ante risky - incomes. If participation constraints were not satised
for some agents, they would prefer to leave the community.
However, to our knowledge, the literature has always studied these various activities
separately. In this paper, we study the interactions between insurance mechanisms and the
provision of a local public good. In our model, the latter increases the future productivity
of the community. The presence of collective action issues in the question we address makes
the introduction of heterogeneity particularly relevant in our model. Indeed, it is well-known
that heterogeneity is a powerful and ambiguous determinant of collective action (Baland and
Platteau, 1999). In the domain of insurance as well as public good provision, heterogeneity in
the agentspreferences is a source of conicts of interests. In our model, we depart from Coate
& Ravallion (1993) by introducing a second mission to the community, namely the provision
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of a public good, and account for the heterogeneity of agents. Heterogeneous preferences are
aggregated through majority voting. The level of "community tax receipts" is determined
by the participation constraints. The latter depends itself on the level of insurance transfers
and on the investment level in the local public good. Given this endogeneously determined
amount of "community tax receipts", agents vote on the share of tax revenues to be devoted
to insurance transfers (and as a consequence the share devoted to public good ). It can be
shown in this setting that agents have single-peaked preferences. As a result, we are able to
make use of standard median voter tools since the voting space is one-dimensional.
The model is developed in section 2. Section 3 discusses some comparative statics. First,
we do some plausibility checks of the model. We then study the impact of a change in the
outside option on both activities of the community. It has a negative impact on both the
development of the community and the insurance level. Finally, better returns to investment
are analyzed.
II. The model
A community is composed of a continuum of individuals (each of which is indexed
by i; i = 1; :::1) and there are two periods of consumption. During the rst period of
consumption, each agent receives a random income y1 which is high y with probability p
and low y with probability (1   p), with y > y. Each unlucky agent receives an amount s
which is chosen by majority voting. The di¤erence between the total amount of taxes and
the total amount of transfers k is invested in a local public good. The invested capital has a
positive impact on the second period income. This second period represents the rest of their
life during which individuals face a similar risky prospect but share income perfectly and
obtain y2 = p:y(k) + (1   p):y(k). Both second-period incomes are increasing and strictly
concave in k. As in the rst period, y(k) is high y(k) with probability p and low y(k) with
probability (1  p).
As usual in the literature on insurance, we assume that it is impossible to sign credibly
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a contract ex ante and that participation constraints ad interim matter. If an individual
chooses not to participate to the insurance mechanism in the rst period, he has an outside
option in the second period, w with w < p:y(0) + (1   p):y(0). This assumption on the
exit option motivates perfect income sharing in the second period. Indeed, if period 2 is
composed of a large number of sub-periods, the participation constraint to future insurance
arrangements is simply assumed not to be binding given that the exit option is su¢ ciently
low. Coate & Ravallion (1993) already mentionned that perfect income sharing is optimal
when the participation constraint is not binding.
Agents have the same attitude towards risk but di¤erent preferences. Individual is
utility function is ui = u(y1) + iu(y2) where the function u is assumed increasing and
strictly concave (u0 > 0 and u00 < 0) and the discount rate  is di¤erent for each agent. i is
observable and is uniformly distributed on an interval [0; 1].
A tax is levied on the high-income agents while low-income agents are subsidized by
the insurance mechanism at a level s. All people in the bad state have the same income
and their participation constraint is far from binding. They all receive the same level of
transfer s because they are ex post identical and no revelation mechanism can elicit their
respective types unless it is possible to contract ex ante (a possibility that would contradict
our assumption of binding constraints ad interim).
The tax amount paid by a high-income agent i, ti (i), is such that the individual
participation constraint is binding :
(1) u(y   ti) + i:u(y2) = u(y) + @i:u(w)
Indeed, because all individuals prefer to have an income as stable as possible ex ante, the
community wants to transfer the highest possible s as long as k is su¢ ciently high and
y   ti >y + s for all i.
The amount invested in the local public good is the di¤erence between tax revenue and
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insurance transfers :
k = p
Z 1
0
thdh   (1  p)s
There is a conict of interest on the choice of s, which is a unidimensional problem.
Indeed, the amount of money to invest in the local public good is given by the budget
constraint which directly depends on the level of s and on the tax amount given by the
participation constraint. Therefore the underlying social choice problem is the location of
a uni-dimensional public good. Standard convexity hypotheses on the agentspreferences
insure that reduced-form preferences on levels of s are single-peaked.
Each individual has a prefered s(i) which is found by solving the maximization problem
expressed below.
Maxs

p:u(y   ti) + (1  p):u(y + s) + i:u(y2(k))

s:t: k = p
R 1
0
thdh   (1  p)s
8i; u(y   ti) + i:u(y2)  u(y) + @i:u(w)
The rst order condition gives us an implicit function of s(i), which is
u0(y + s) = i:u0(y2(k)):y02(k):(1  p)
while the second order condition is negative everywhere, not only in a neighbourhood of si .
This guarantees single-peaked preferences.
The level of s is chosen by majority voting before people know if they have a high or a
low income in the rst period.
Thanks to the single-peakeness of preferences, we know that there exists a unique Con-
dorcet winner, sm = s
(m) where m is the median-voter.
In order to understand the interactions between equilibrium values of sm and k, we now
proceed with several comparatives statics exercises.
Note that in this model, the question on the e¢ ciency of s and k is not of real interest.
Indeed, when the discount rate of each agent i is uniformly distributed, the median voter
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coincides with the mean voter i.e. the voter who has the mean utility level whatever the level
of s. So, the chosen s is pareto optimal No ine¢ cien level of s may occur under a symetrical
distribution of i. However it is possible that, when there are more impatient agents than
patient ones, an under-investment in the insurance scheme occurs. Hence, the e¢ ciency of
s and k depends on the distribution of types in the community.
III. Comparative Statics
In this section, we will rst check whether our model is realistic by testing the impact of
changes in the income variability and changes in the total wealth of the community. These
two rst exercises are mainly plausibility checks. Then, results are explored in two directions.
Firstly, the impact of the outside option on local insurance and development is computed.
Secondly, external shocks of the kind that may be generated by a foreign NGO are modeled
as changes either in the return to public good investment or in the absolute level of future
income.
A. Plausibility checks
In order to have a model representing in a relevant way reality, some phenomena have
to take place within its frame. Indeed, the formalism adopted has to be compatible with
straighforward behaviours.
The rst one we can think of is in the case of risk increasing. Hence, the demand for
insurance has to increase as well in such a case. To check if we observe this phenomenon
in our model, we use a mean preserving spread of the income and we study the impact of
a more variable income on the chosen s and k when the mean of the income is preserved.
Lets have,
y =   + x(k) with probability (1  p)
y = 1 p
p
 + z(k) with probability p
By allowing  to increase, we introduce a greater ex-post inequality within the population
6
but without a¤ecting the returns on the investment in the local public good.
The impact on s is positive :
ds
d
=
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2
R 1
0
u0(y th) u0(y)
u0(y th) dh: [u
00(y2):y022 (k) + u
0(y2):y002(k)]
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2 [u00(y2):y022 (k) + u0(y2):y002(k)]
h
1  p
1 p
R 1
0
dth
ds
dh
i > 0
The model would be implausible if another result were deduced. Indeed, when risk
increases the community chooses to increase the transfer to poor people as a simple and
direct consequence of risk aversion.
The impact on k is indeterminate :
dk
d
= p
Z 1
0
@th
@
dh   (1  p) ds
d
T 0
This can easily be explained by the fact that when the variability of the income increase,
the total amount of taxes that the community may take, p
R 1
0
thdh, is greater. Indeed,
p
R 1
0
@th
@
dh = (1   p):
R 1
0
u0(y th) u0(y)
u0(y th) dh > 0. Although this e¤ect is positive, the amount
devoted to s also increases and we dont know the sign of the total e¤ect on k for sure.
Another thing we can think of is the impact of a change in the global wealth of the
community. The model has to preserve the indeterminate e¤ect of income on the insurance
demand. It must be compatible with assumptions on preferences that make richer people
prefer more insurance and with opposite assumptions. Hence, we check how s and k will
be a¤ected if everyone in the community is richer. To evaluate this e¤ect introducing other
e¤ects like income variability, let us dene
y =   x0(k) with probability (1  p)
y = + z0(k) with probability p
A variation in  will a¤ect the whole communitys wealth. Note that the impact of a variation
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of  on s is indeterminate :
ds
d
=  
u00(y + s)  i:(1  p)
h
u00(y2(k)):y02(k) +
R 1
0
@ti
@
di: [u
00(y2(k)):y022 (k) + u
0(y2(k)):y002(k)]
i
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2 [u00(y2(k)):y022 (k) + u0(y2(k)):y002(k)]
h
1  p
1 p
R 1
0
dth
ds
dh
i T 0
More assumptions in the utility function would be needed to know the sign of this derivative.
As for s, the impact of  on k is indeterminate:
dk
d
= p
Z 1
0
@th
@
dh   (1  p) ds
d
T 0
Indeed, if we know that a greater income for everyone will positively a¤ect the total
amount of taxes the community may take, we dont know if the community will decide to
a¤ect it to development or to insurance. This will depend on the agentspreferences. The
ambiguity of pure income e¤ects is commonplace in microeconomics and should be viewed
as a desirable feature of the model.
B. Outside option variations
The level of the exit option is a particularly interesting parameter in our model. Indeed,
the implied context is one of a rural community wih no capital or insurance markets. The
outside option may therefore vary widely following a random shock or a public policy such
as the building of a nearby road. The consequences of such events on the local group are
important to understand. The impact of w on s is undoubtedly and quite surprisingly
negative :
ds
dw
=
i:(1  p):p
R 1
0
@th
@w
dh [u
00(y2):y022 (k) + u
0(y2):y002(k)]
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2 [u00(y2):y022 (k) + u0(y2):y002(k)]
h
1  p
1 p
R 1
0
dth
ds
dh
i < 0
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The participation constraint will be more quickly binding and the total amount of taxes will
be less important. And people will decide to reduce the amount invested in development too
:
dk
dw
= p
Z 1
0
@th
@w
dh   (1  p) ds
dw
< 0
It means that when the outside option becomes more attractive, agents refuse to pay as
much taxes as before. Hence, the level of insurance and of investment in the local public
good are negatively a¤ected. The unexpected impact on investment originates from the fact
that insurance and public good are funded through the same channel. Tightening the source
of funds by making participation constraints bind earlier is therefore equally detrimental
to both activities of the community. Destructuration of local communities through massive
urban investments can therefore be explained in our model. It must also be noticed that the
building of a road, for example, does not only lower migration costs and hence increases w,
but also has a positive impact on future rural incomes. The result about w should therefore
be looked at together with the next series of computations, since it is di¢ cult to come up
with a clear example of a raise in w that is not accompanied by some change in y2.
C. Marginal and absolute returns on investment variations
A rural development project or a NGO may act on the community by several means.
One is to increase the income of all the agents of the community in the second period.
Another is an increase of the local returns to investment. The latter is typically the target
of "participatory" or "community-based" projects. To model these impacts, the income
functions may be written as follows :
y1 = y with probability (1  p) and y2 = + (k) with probability (1  p)
y with probability p + (k) with probability p
First, lets study the impact of an unconditional income increase. The impact on s is
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positive :
ds
d
=
i:(1  p):
h
u00(y2):y02(k) + p
R 1
0
dth
d
dh [u
00(y2):y022 (k) + u
0(y2):y002(k)]
i
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2 [u00(y2):y022 (k) + u0(y2):y002(k)]
h
1  p
1 p
R 1
0
dth
ds
dh
i > 0
Because the agents expect that in the future their income will be greater, they will accept to
give a greater participation (ti ) in the rst period if they are rich. This is the case because
for a given level of ti the lefthand side of the participation constraint is greater than before
while the righthand side remains the same. So, the indirect e¤ect of  on s is positive and
the direct e¤ect too.
But the impact on k is indeterminate :
dk
d
= p
Z 1
0
dth
d
dh   (1  p) ds
d
T 0
Expectedly, the total amount of taxes collected is greater. A greater amount is devoted
to transfers. We cant say anything about the impact on k.
The second way in which a NGO may increase the second period income in a community
is to improve the return of investment in the local public good. So we study the impact on
s and k of a change in . The impact on s is positive for the same reasons as before :
ds
d
=
i:(1  p):
h
k(u00(y2):y02(k) + u
0(y2):y002(k)) + p
R 1
0
dth
d
dh [u
00(y2):y022 (k) + u
0(y2):y002(k)]
i
u00(y + s) + i:(1  p)2 [u00(y2):y022 (k) + u0(y2):y002(k)]
h
1  p
1 p
R 1
0
dth
ds
dh
i > 0
while the impact on k is indeterminate :
dk
d
= p
Z 1
0
dth
d
dh   (1  p) ds
d
T 0
So, a NGO may have a certain e¤ect on the insurance mechanism but its action will
have indeterminate e¤ects on the development of the community. The e¤ect on development
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will depend on the substitution between informal insurance and development.
IV. References
1. AMBEC, S. (2005), "Voting over informal risk sharing rules", mimeo
2. BALAND, J.M. and J.P. PLATTEAU (1999), "The Ambiguous impact of In-
equality on Local Resource Management", World Development 27 (5), 773-788
3. BERGSTROM, T., L. BLUME and H. VARIAN (1986), "On the Private Provi-
sion of Public Goods", Journal of Public Economics 29 (1), 25-49
4. COATE, S., and M. RAVALLION (1993), Reciprocity without commitment:
Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements, Journal
of Development Economics 44, 1-24
5. FAFCHAMPS, M. (1992), Solidarity network in rural Africa: Rational peasant
with a moral economy, Economic Development and Cultural Change 41(1), 147-
177 26
6. FAFCHAMPS, M.(1995) "The rural community, mutual assistance, and struc-
tural adjustment." In State, Markets, and Civil Institutions: New Theories, New
Practices, and their Implications for Rural Development, ed. A. de Janvry, S.
Radwan and E. Thorbecke (Mc Qillan Press)
7. FAFCHAMPS, M (2003) "Rural Poverty, Risk and Development" (Northampton,
MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing)
8. FAFCHAMPS, M and S. LUND (2003), "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philip-
pines", Journal of Development Economics, 71, 261-287
9. GIBBARD, A. (1973), "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: a General Result",
Econometrica, 41, 587-601.
11
10. HOFF, K. and A. SEN (2005) "The kin system as a poverty trap?", Worl Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3575, April 2005
11. MAY, K. (1952), "A set of independent necessary and su¢ cient conditions for
simple majority decision", Econometrica, 20, 680-684.
12. MOULIN, H. (1988), Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
13. PLATTEAU, J. P. (1996), Traditional sharing norm as an obstacle to economic
growth in tribal societies, Cahier de recherche du CRED, Université de Namur,
Belgium.
14. PLATTEAU, J. P. (2000), Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Develop-
ment, Amsterdam, Nertherland: Harwood Academic Publishes
15. SATTERTHWAITE, M. (1975), "Strategy-Proofness and Arrows Conditions :
Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Wel-
fare Functions", Journal of Economic Theory, 10, p. 187-217.
16. WADE, R. (1994), "Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action
in South India", San Fransisco: ICS Press
17. WOLF, C. (1955), "Institutions and economic development", American Economic
Review, 45 (5), 867-883
12
